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"FIVE-HUNDRED-YEAR FLOOD PLAINS"
AND OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF




Mentally retarded persons receive better care, treatment and train-
ing in small community residences than in large isolated institutions.'
State and federal policy statements implicitly acknowledge this fact.
2
Furthermore, published studies demonstrate what the Supreme Court,
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,3 appeared to rec-
ognize: Community residences do not decrease surrounding property
values, increase crime, or detrimentally affect neighborhoods.4 None-
theless, many state statutes which purport to assist the establishment
of community residences fail to conform to their own stated policy
* Assistant Attorney General, New York State Department of Law. Member
of New York and District of Columbia Bars. B.S., 1974, Cornell University; J.D.,
1977, Fordham University School of Law. The author was Research Editor of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal, Volume V, 1976-1977. The views expressed in this
Article do not necessarily represent the views of the New York State Department
of Law.
1. Studies undertaken over the past half century have repeatedly demonstrated
that mentally retarded persons develop more rapidly in residential settings than in
institutions. See J. JACOBSON & A. SCHWARTZ, THE EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY
LIVING ALTERNATIVES FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 5-6 (Living Alter-
natives Research Project 1982) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
Additionally, experts in several lawsuits brought to force states to establish more
community residences have uniformly testified to the superiority of community
placement over institutional placement. See Society for Good Will to Retarded
Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1306-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984); ARC of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F.
Supp. 473, 481-82 (D.N.D. 1982); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 195 (D.N.H.
1981).
2. See infra notes 8-25 and accompanying text.
3. 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985).
4. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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goals.5 Similarly, many local ordinances specifically aimed at ex-
cluding non-traditional families6 stand as barriers to the establishment
of community residences. These statutes and ordinances, however,
may no longer be viable after City of Cleburne.7
This Article examines the impact of state statutes and local or-
dinances on the establishment of community residences for mentally
retarded persons in light of the Court's decision in City of Cleburne.
First, Part II traces federal and state policies advocating the estab-
lishment of community residences for mentally retarded persons.
Part III examines barriers to the establishment of community re-
sidences, including neighborhood opposition based on unjustified
fears, and state statutes and local ordinances that effectively impede
the development of residences. Part IV analyzes the application of
the equal protection clause to statutes and ordinances affecting
mentally retarded persons and discusses City of Cleburne. Part V
considers the impact of that decision on state statutes that: (1) limit
the number of persons that can be placed in community residences;
5. See infra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 98-140 and accompanying text. Several law review articles
on state statutes affecting the establishment of community residences appeared prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne. See generally Boyd, Strategies
in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements for Retarded Citizens: Parens
Patriae Meets Police Powers, 25 VILL. L. REV. 273 (1980); Hopperton, A State
Legislative Strategy for Ending Exclusionary Zoning of Community Homes, 19
URB. L. ANN. 47 (1980); Kressel, The Community Residence Movement: Land Use
Conflicts & Planning Imperatives, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 137 (1975);
Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for People": Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Restric-
tions on Community Homes for Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1979);
Schonfeld, "Not in My Neighborhood:" Legal Challenges to the Establishment of
Community Residences for the Mentally Disabled in New York State, 13 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 281 (1985); Tuoni, Deinstitutionalization and Community Resistance by
Zoning Restrictions, 66 MASS. L. REv. 125 (1981); Note, Group Homes and
Deinstitutionalization: The Legislative Response to Exclusionary Zoning, 6 VT. L.
REV. 509 (1981); Note, A Review of the Conflict Between Community-Based Group
Homes for the Mentally Retarded and Restrictive Zoning, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 669
(1980); Comment, Zoning the Mentally Retarded into Single-Family Residential
Areas: A Grape of Wrath or the Fermentation of Wisdom, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
385; Comment, Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Retarded in Maine: The Inevitable
Face-Off With Zoning, 35 ME. L. REV. 33 (1983); Comment, Exclusionary Zoning
of Community Facilities, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 167 (1980); Comment, Zoning and
Community Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded-Boon or Bust?, 7 OHIo
N.U.L. REV. 64 (1980); Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and its Effects on Group
Homes in Areas Zoned for Single-Family Dwellings, 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 677
(1976); Comment, Can the Mentally Retarded Enjoy "Yards That are Wide?, " 28
WAYNE L. REV. 1349 (1982); see also Note, Applicability and Application of Zoning
Regulations to Single Residences Employed for Group Living of Mentally Retarded
Persons, 32 A.L.R.4TH 1018 (1984).
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(2) impose quotas and distance limitations on residences; and (3)
require notification of local officials and impose conditions not placed
on other homes before a community residence can commence op-
erations.
Part V also discusses the effect of City of Cleburne on local
ordinances limiting the number of unrelated persons who can live
in a residence. Part VI of this Article examines the shortcomings
of the American Bar Association's Model Statute for regulating the
establishment of residences. Part VII then recommends a model
statute which includes prohibitions on the use of restrictive covenants
and other strategies used by homeowners attempting to bar com-
munity residences from their neighborhoods. Finally, this Article
concludes that many existing state statutes and local ordinances
affecting the establishment of community residences are constitu-
tionally invalid and should be amended in a manner consistent with
the Article's recommendations.
II. Federal and State Policies Supporting the Development of
Community Residences
A. Federal Policy Advocating the Establishment of Community
Residences
The federal policy promoting deinstitutionalization and the care
and treatment of mentally retarded persons in community settings
can be traced back to the 1960's. In 1963, based upon recommen-
dations made by the President's Panel on Mental Retardation, Pres-
ident Kennedy sent to Congress a "special message on Mental Illness
and Mental Retardation" ' in which he presented a legislative package
offering "a bold new approach" which would "reduce, over a
number of years, and by hundreds of thousands, the persons confined
to ... institutions" and "retain in and return to the community
the ... mentally retarded." 9 Congress enacted many of President
Kennedy's recommendations in the Maternal and Child Health and
8. President's Message to Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation,
1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1466.
9. Id. at 1467, 1477. President Kennedy's legislation was designed to bolster
"our fundamental community ... programs which can do much to eliminate or
correct the harsh environmental conditions which often are associated with mental
retardation." Id. at 1467. The legislation, authorizing funding for community health
centers, recognized the need to move "from the outmoded use of distant custodial
institutions to the concept of community-centered agencies." Id. at 1474.
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Mental Retardation Planning Amendments to the Social Security
Act 10 and the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental
Health Centers Construction Act of 1963.11 Both statutes were aimed
at establishing community facilities for mentally retarded persons. 2
Congress continued its policy favoring deinstitutionalization and
the development of community residences with its passage of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975.11
That statute declared that mentally retarded persons have a right to
live in a setting that is least restrictive of their personal liberty. 14
Congress accompanied the Act with funding for community based
placements, declaring that institutional care was both "inappropriate
and inhumane" for most mentally retarded persons. 5 Senator Javits
noted that the statute established a "clear federal policy that the
mentally retarded have a right to appropriate treatment, services and
habilitation." 16
10. Grants for Planning Comprehensive Action to Combat Mental Retardation,
Pub. L. No. 88-156, § 5, 77 Stat. 275 (1963). This statute authorized appropriations
for states to plan for "comprehensive [s]tate and community action to combat
mental retardation." Id.
11. Mental Retardation Facilities Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77
Stat. 282 (1963). This statute authorized appropriations for community mental
health centers as well as grants for research centers and teacher training. Id.
12. See supra notes 10-11.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1), (2) (1982). The statute provides that "persons with
developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and ha-
bilitation for such disabilities .... [T]he treatment, services, and habilitation for
a person with developmental disabilities should be . . . provided in the setting that
is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty." Id.
15. HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, DEVELOPMENTALLY
DISABLED ASSISTANCE AND BILL OF RiGrrs ACT OF 1975, H.R. REP. No. 58, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 919,
933.
16. S. REP. 160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 29,820 (1975). Senator
Javits's statement was noted by the Supreme Court in Pennhurst State School v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 22 (1981). The Court held, however, that Congress did
not intend to create state obligations when it passed the statute but only to provide
state funding. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals had previously noted in
Halderman "a clear congressional preference for deinstitutionalization." Halderman
v. Pennhurst State School, 612 F.2d 84, 104 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
451 U.S. 1 (1981). No court has yet held that.mentally retarded persons have a
constitutional right to placement in a community residence, and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that they do not have a constitutional right to such
placement. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d
1239 (2d Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court, however, has held that retarded persons
do have the constitutional right to appropriate care and treatment in accordance
with professional standards and a level of training adequate to ensure safety and
[Vol. XVI
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B. State Policies Advocating Establishment of Residences
Statements made by state legislatures throughout the country dem-
onstrate that the placement of mentally retarded persons in small
community residences instead of institutions is a nationwide goal. 7
freedom from undue restraint. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
Other federal statutes demonstrate a federal policy favoring deinstitutionalization.
See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357 (1981) (federal funding for community based care); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § 796 (1982) (statute designed to improve handicapped individual's
abilities to live with greater independence and self-sufficiency); Social Services
Amendments of 1974, § 2001, 42 U.S.C. 1397 (1982) (statements favoring community
based care over institutional care); The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, § 612, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1982) (states required to insure that
handicapped children are not educated in isolated surroundings).
17. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5115 (West 1984) ("mentally . . . hand-
icapped persons are entitled to live in normal residential surroundings"); CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 31-23-303(2)(a) (1977) ("establishment of state-licensed group homes
for . . .developmentally disabled persons is a matter of statewide concern"); FLA.
STAT. § 393.062 (1983) ("greatest priority shall be given to the development and
implementation of community-based residential placements"); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 333E-1(7) (1985) ("deinstitutionalization of the developmentally disabled is a
major goal of the [sitate"); IDAHO CODE § 67-6530 (1980) ("mentally ... hand-
icapped persons are entitled to live in normal residential surroundings"); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 358A.25(l) (West Supp. 1987) ("[ilt is the intent of this section to
assist in improving the quality of life of developmentally disabled persons by
integrating them into the mainstream of society by making available to them
community residential opportunities in the residential areas of this state"); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:476 (West Supp. 1987) ("mentally ...handicapped persons
are entitled to live in the least restrictive environment in their own community and
in normal residential surroundings"); MD. HEAITH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 7-317(1),
(2) (1982) ("there is a need for public group homes for . . .mentally retarded
individuals. . . [and such homes] are necessary components in meeting the residential
needs of mentally retarded individuals"); MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 125.216a(2)
(West 1986) ("persons in need of community residential care shall not be excluded
by zoning from the benefits of normal residential surroundings"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-20-101(1), (2) (1987) ("secure for each person who may be developmentally
disabled such treatment and habilitation ... in a community-based setting"); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN § 278.021(1) (Michie Supp. 1986) ("remove obstacles imposed by
zoning ordinances which prevent persons who are mentally retarded from living in
normal residences"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-20 (1982) ("policy of this [s]tate to
provide handicapped persons with the opportunity to live in a normal residential
environment"); OR. REV. STAT. § 443.590 (1985) ("mentally handicapped persons
are entitled to live as normally as possible within communities and should not be
excluded from communities because their disability requires them to live in groups");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-21-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985) ("public policy of state to provide
... support necessary to enable mentally retarded individuals to remain at home
and within their respective communities"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-24-101 (1980)
("remove any zoning obstacles which prevent mentally retarded persons from living
in normal residential surroundings"); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486.2 (1981) ("policy
of this [s]tate that . . . mentally retarded . . . not be excluded by county or municipal
19881
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Typical of those statements is the New York State Legislature's
"[d]eclaration of legislative findings and intent"18 accompanying the
New York statute declaring that community residences for mentally
retarded persons are family units for the purpose of all local laws
and ordinances. 9 The legislature has stated:
[M]entally disabled individuals have the right to attain the benefits
of normal residential surroundings .... It is the intention of this
legislation to meet the needs of the mentally disabled in New
York State by providing, wherever possible, that such persons
remain in normal community settings, receiving such treatment,
care, rehabilitation and education as may be appropriate to each
individual. 20
Governor Carey, in his approval memorandum, concurred with the
sentiments expressed by the legislature:2 1
The national movement towards providing care and treatment for
the mentally disabled in the least restrictive environment consistent
with their needs has generated a great demand for community
residential facilities for persons formerly served in [sitate insti-
tutions .... [T]he bill aims to facilitate the establishment of
community residences by discouraging frivolous legal challenges
that have needlessly delayed proper establishment of such facilities
in the past. 22
Other state legislatures have made similar pronouncements. The
California Legislature, for example, has noted that "[it is the policy
zoning ordinances from the benefits of normal residential surroundings"); 1978
Ariz. Sess. Laws 650 ("community-based housing programs for mentally retarded
persons should be expanded and should be the foundation of the state's mental
retardation residential program"); 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 1 ("mentally disabled
individuals have the right to attain the benefits of normal residential surroundings");
1977 Vt. Laws 96 ("policy of the state . . .that developmentally disabled . . .not
be excluded by municipal zoning ordinances from the benefits of normal residential
surroundings").
18. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 1.
19. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(f) (McKinney Supp. 1988). For a detailed
discussion of the New York statute, see Schonfeld, "Not in My Neighborhood:"
Legal Challenges to the Establishment of Community Residences for the Mentally
Disabled in New York State, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1985); see also NEW
YORK STATE MENTAL HYGIENE AND ADDICTION CONTROL COMMITTEE, AFTER EIGHT
YEARS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE, IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 1978 NEW
YORK STATE SITE SELECTION LAW GOVERNING COMMUNITY RESIDENCES FOR THE
MENTALLY DISABLED (1986) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office)
[hereinafter AFTER EIGHT YEARS].
20. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 1.
21. Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 468, N.Y. Laws (July 6,
1978), reprinted in [1978] N.Y. Laws 1821-22 (McKinney).
22. Id. at 1821.
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of this state . . . that mentally and physically handicapped persons
are entitled to live in normal residential surroundings and should
not be excluded therefrom because of their disabilit[ies]." 23 Similarly,
the Iowa State Legislature has stated that "[ilt is the intent [of the
statute] to assist in improving the quality of life of developmentally
disabled persons by integrating them into the mainstream of society
by making available to them community residential opportunitites
in the residential areas of this state." 24 Finally, in North Carolina,
the state legislature has declared that "it is the public policy of this
state to provide handicapped persons with the opportunity to live in a
normal residential environment. ' 25 Thus, there is little question that
both federal and state policies currently favor deinstitutionalization
and the establishment of community residences for retarded persons.
III. Obstacles to the Establishment of Community Residences
A. Neighborhood Opposition
The nationwide trend towards deinstitutionalization and community
residences, however, has spurred attempts by homeowners throughout
the country to block the establishment of residences in their neigh-
borhoods. 26 Neighbors have resisted community residences out of
23. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5115 (West 1984).
24. IowA CODE ANN. § 358A.25(1) (West Supp. 1987).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-20 (1982).
26. See infra notes 30-31, 14344, 156, 175 for cases in which communities
throughout the country have attempted to use zoning ordinances and restrictive
covenants to exclude community residences.
The Willowbrook Wars chronicles some of the attempts by neighbors to block
the establishment of community residences through extra-legal means. D. ROTHMAN
& S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 187-88 (1984) [hereinafter ROTHMAN &
ROTHMAN]. The following excerpt gives several examples:
Communities .... could, and often did, convince the owner of the
property to be sold or leased to the state to cancel the agreement. In
a handful of very wealthy communities, like suburban Scarsdale, neighbors
would join together to buy the house themselves, . . . [b]ut not every
community could come up with one hundred or two hundred thousand
dollars, and so most of them had to resort to still other strategies. In
some cases, angry residents persuaded an owner to find another tenant
or buyer, particularly when he had a continuing stake in the area, by
virtue of either his business, his professional practice, or his other property
holdings. Thus one physician had initially been willing to lease a second
house that he owned in the Cobble Hill section of Brooklyn . . . so that
St. Vincent's, a Catholic charity, could open a group home. But when
neighbors protested, he backed off and refused to sign the lease.
At other times, community protest so prolonged the process of approval
19881
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fear that property values would decrease, from concern that the persons
living in the residences would commit criminal acts, and out of the
belief that community residences would adversely affect the character
of the neighborhood. 27 In fighting the establishment of community
residences, residents have resorted not only to legal activity 2 but
also to such extra-legal activities as threats to property owners wishing
to sell their homes for community residence use,29 arson30 and, in
at least one instance, the purchase of a home proposed for a com-
munity residence for the sole purpose of blocking the establishment
of that residence.3 l
that the owner tired of waiting and found another purchaser. Take the
case of 3350 Cross Bronx Expressway, a proposed group home in the
Bronx.... [The site was located in June 1978 and inspections were
completed by September 1978.] [In mid-October, Community Planning
Board 10 objected, ostensibly because the house lacked a backyard and
was too near a highway .... [Alternative sites were investigated and
found inadequate], whereupon the board requested a formal hearing
under the Padavan Law. The -hearing -was held on February 9, 1979,
and in March the commissioner decided in favor of the site, at just
which point the owner sold the property to a different buyer.
In still other instances ... the situation could get nasty. Some opponents
were prepared to use scare tactics, ranging from abusive telephone calls
at all times of the day and night to outright threats of violence to the
owner and his family .... [Although such incidents were not very com-
mon, approximately] thirteen [such] incidents occurred. .-.. Nevertheless,
its importance was greater than its frequency implied, first because these
incidents generally occurred . . . as .. . a last resort when the retarded
were abbut to arrive, which meant that the staff had invested great
energy in the project .... Second, the recurring fear was that hooliganism
would be contagious, success in scaring off an owner in one neighborhood
serving as a lesson for another. Finally, these incidents were so morally
outrageous as to raise the question whether integration of the retarded
was possible when prejudices ran so deep.
Id.
27. See R. LUBIN, A. SCHWARTZ, W. ZIGMAN & M. JANICKI, COMMUNITY
ACCEPTANCE OF RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS
5, 7 (Living Alternatives Research Project 1982) (available at Fordham Urban Law
Journal office) (study involving 331 New York State community residences analyzing
reasons for neighborhood opposition to community residences as well as neigh-
borhood attitudes after opening of residences); see also ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN,
supra note 26, at 187-88 (describing neighborhood opposition to community resid-
ences).
28. See infra notes 143-44, 175 for discussion of lawsuits in which communities
have fought community residences.
29. See supra note 26.
30. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp.
1300, 1340 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (three instances of arson destroying community resid-
ences on Long Island noted in testimony at trial), rev'd on other grounds, 737
F.2d 1239 (2d Cir; 1984).
31. People v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated in part
on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (1983).
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No documented studies, however, justify these concerns or related
efforts to impede the development of residences.32 In fact, the studies
performed demonstrate that such fears are unfounded.3 ,A study by
Dr. Julian Wolpert of Princeton University, for example, comparing
forty-two New York State communities containing community re-
sidences with forty-two New York State communities without resid-
ences concluded that: (1) property values in communities with group
homes increased (or decreased) at rates comparable to communities
without group homes; (2) the proximity of neighboring properties
to a group home did not significantly affect their market values;
(3) immediately adjacent properties did not experience declines in
property values; and (4) the establishment of community residences
did not generate greater neighboring property turnover than in neigh-
borhoods without residences. 34 A study conducted by the New York
State Institute for Basic Research involving 368 residences concluded
that neighbors' fears that mentally retarded persons in residences
would engage in anti-social behavior were unfounded.35 Finally, an-
32. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
33. Id.
34. J. WOLPERT, GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED: AN INVESTIGATION
OF NEIGHBORHOOD PROPERTY IMPACTS i, ii, 15 (New York State Office of Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities 1978) (available at Fordham Urban Law
Journal office). The study reached the same conclusions when it was updated in
1982. See L. DOLAN & J. WOLPERT, LONG TERM NEIGHBORHOOD PROPERTY IMPACTS
OF GROUP HOMES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE i, ii, 10-13 (Woodrow Wilson
School Discussion Paper Series, Princeton University 1982) (available at Fordham
Urban Law Journal office) (study involving 32 New York State community resid-
ences). Other studies have reached similar conclusions. See D. LAUBER, IMPACTS
ON THE SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOOD OF GROUP HOMES FOR PERSONS WITH DE-
VELOPMENTAL DIsABILITIES 2 (Governor's Planning Council on Developmental Dis-
abilities, Springfield, Illinois 1986) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office)
(study of 14 Illinois community residences discovered no decrease in property values
after establishment of residences) [hereinafter LAUBER]; M. LINDAUER, P. TUNG &
F. O'DONNELL, THE EFFECT OF COMMUNITY RESIDENCES FOR THE MENTALLY RE-
TARDED ON REAL-ESTATE VALUES IN THE NEIGHBORHOODS IN WHICH THEY ARE
LOCATED 1-2 (State University of New York, College at Brockport, N.Y. 1980)
(available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office) (study of community residences's
impact on property values in seven neighborhoods in medium-sized northeastern
city and three adjoining towns). A study conducted by the Suffolk Community
Council involving 10 Suffolk County, New York, community residences reached
the same conclusion as the Wolpert study and noted that studies performed in
Ohio, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan also concluded that the establishment
of community residences did not lower surrounding property values. SUFFOLK COM-
MUNITY COUNCIL, INC., THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY RESIDENCES UPON NEIGHBORHOOD
PROPERTY VALUES viii, 19-20, 33-42 (1984) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal
office).
35. R. LUBIN, M. JANICKI, W. ZIGMAN & R. Ross, THE LIKELIHOOD OF POLICE
1988]
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other study involving 368 residences found that community residences
in general have the same exterior appearance as other residences in
a neighborhood. 6 These studies thus demonstrate that basic at-
titudes towards community residences are unjustified.
B. State Statutes and Local Ordinances
Despite official state policies favoring the establishment of com-
munity residences, 37 state statutes often impede the establishment of
those residences. A majority of state legislatures have enacted statutes
governing the establishment of community residences in their states s.3
CONTACTS WITH DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS IN COMMUNITY RESIDENCES
5-6 (Living Alternatives Research Project 1982) (available at Fordham Urban Law
Journal office) (study involving 368 New York State community residences finding
that mentally retarded persons in community residences are arrested at far lower
rate than members of general public and that developmentally disabled occupants
of community residences are rarely involved with police).
36. M. JANICKI, PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW YORK'S
COMMUNITY RESIDENCES (Living Alternatives Research Project 1982) (available at
Fordham Urban Law Journal office) (study of 368 New York State community
residences showed that residences were physically integrated into communities); M.
JANICKI & W. ZIGMAN, PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITY RESIDENCES 12 (Living Alternatives Research Project 1983) (available
at Fordham Urban Law Journal office) (study of 368 New York State community
residences showed that residences were homelike dwellings in terms of structure
and physically integrated into communities). Homeowners have also opposed neigh-
boring community residences on the grounds that such residences might increase
traffic and the demand for neighborhood resources. R. LUBN, A. SCHWARTZ, W.
ZIGMAN & M. JANICKI, COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE OF RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS FOR
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 7-8, Table 3 (Living Alternatives Research
Project 1982) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office). There are no
known studies, however, demonstrating that community residences affect local traffic
or neighborhood resources in such a way as to require treatment different from
other single family and residential dwellings for zoning purposes. In City of Cleburne,
the Fifth Circuit found that the city, in its attempt to justify different treatment,
had failed to prove that mentally retarded persons in community residences created
more traffic than residents of other homes. Cleburne Living Center v. City of
Clehurne, 726 F.2d 191, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 473
U.S. 432 (1985).
37. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-582 (1986); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 5115-5116 (West 1984); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 30-28-115(2)(a), 31-23-303(2)(a)
(1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-3e, 8-3f (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 9, § 4923 (Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 321-15.6(b)(2), 333E-2 (1985);
IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6530 to -6532 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-21-12, 16-13-
21-14 (West Supp. 1986); IoWA CODE ANN. § 358A.25 (West Supp. 1987); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28:381(8), 28:475-478 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 30, § 4962-A (Supp. 1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-101(h)
(Supp. 1986), 7-317 to -318, 7-416 (1982); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.216a(2),
125.583b(4) (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.020 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT.
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Most of these statutes provide that community residences for mentally
retarded persons can be placed in areas zoned for single family
uses.39 Many of the statutes are accompanied by public policy state-
ments noting that mentally retarded persons are better served in the
community than in institutions and that there is a state-wide need
for such residences." Virtually all of these statutes, however, place
limits on the number of retarded persons that may live in a com-
munity residence permitted in a single family or residential zone, 4'
CODE ANN. §§ 53-20-101, 53-20-301 to -302, 76-2-412 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 18-1744 to -1747 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.021 (Michie Supp. 1987);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-66.1, 40:55D-66.2 (West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 3-21-1(c) (1985); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney Supp. 1988);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168-20 to -23 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-16-14(2) (Supp.
1985); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.19 (Anderson Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 443.580 to -.600 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-24-22 to -23 (1980 & Supp. 1987);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-7-830(a) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1987), 44-21-20 (Law. Co-op.
1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-24-102 (1980); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011n
(Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-2.5 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 4409(d) (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 8-24-50b (Supp. 1987), 27-17-1
to -2 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 46.03(22) (West 1987), 59.97(15) (West Supp.
1987).
Courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of such statutes against claims
by municipalities and homeowners that they unlawfully impinge on their right to
enact zoning ordinances. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. California Dep't of
Health, 63 Cal. App. 3d 473, 133 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1976); Glennon Heights, Inc.
v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1983); Thelen v. City of Missoula,
168 Mont. 375, 543 P.2d 173 (1975); Mental Health Ass'n of Union County, Inc.
v. City of Elizabeth, 180 N.J. Super. 304, 434 A.2d 688 (1981); Zubli v. Community
Mainstreaming Assocs., Inc., 102 Misc. 2d 320, 423 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 624, 425 N.Y.S.2d 263 (2d Dep't 1979), aff'd as modified,
50 N.Y.2d 1024, 410 N.E.2d 746, 431 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1980); Mongony v. Bevilacqua,
432 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1981); Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 13
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). But see Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St.
2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980) (state statute purporting to override local zoning
ordinances and allow community residential facilities in residential districts violates
state constitution's home rule provisions), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
For a general discussion of this type of state statute, see Salsich, Group Homes,
Shelters and Congregate Housing: Deinstitutionalization Policies and the NIMBY
Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. TR. J. 413 (1986); Steinman, The Effects of
Land-Use Restrictions on the Establishment of Community Residences for the
Disabled: A National Study, 19 THE URB. LAW. 1 (1987).
39. See supra note 38. In Louisiana, however, community residences are per-
mitted by right only in residential districts zoned for multiple family dwellings.
See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:478(A) (West Supp. 1987). Virginia's statute permits
residences in "appropriate residential zoning district[s]." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
486.2 (1981).
40. See supra note 17.
41. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-582(A) (1986) (six or fewer); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5116 (West 1984) (six or fewer); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 30-
28-115(2)(a), 31-23-303(2)(a) (1977) (eight or fewer); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
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while, presumably, other residences permitted in single family zones
may house an unlimited number of residents.4 2 In Hawaii and Oregon,
only five mentally retarded persons may live together in a residence
located in a single family zone. 3 Ten other states provide that only
six mentally retarded persons may reside together in such zones."
Furthermore, seventeen states and the District of Columbia impose
distance limitations that prohibit a community residence from locating
within a certain distance of another community residence.45 In Utah,
3e(a) (West Supp. 1987) (six or fewer); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4923(a) (Supp.
1986) (10 or fewer); HAW. REV. STAT. § 321.15.6(b)(2) (1985) (five or fewer); IDAHO
CODE § 67-6531 (1980) (eight or fewer); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-21-12, 16-13-
22-1 (West Supp. 1986) (four to eight persons); IOWA CODE ANN. § 358A.25(2)(b)
(West Supp. 1987) (eight or fewer); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:477(1) (West Supp.
1987) (six or fewer); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962-A(1-A(B)) (Supp. 1987)
(eight or fewer); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 7-101(h)(2) (Supp. 1986) (four
to eight persons); MICH. Comp,. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.216a(2), 125.583b(2) (West 1986)
(six or fewer); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.020(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (eight or fewer);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-412(3) (1987) (eight or fewer); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-
1744 (1983) (four to eight persons); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.021(2) (Michie
Supp. 1987) (six or fewer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40-55D-66.2 (West Supp. 1986) (15
or fewer); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-1(c) (1985) (10 or fewer); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW §§ 41.34(a)(1), (f) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (four to 14 persons); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 168-21 (1982) (six or fewer); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-16-14(2) (Supp. 1985)
(six or fewer); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.19(3) (Anderson Supp. 1986) (six to
eight persons); OR. REV. STAT. § 443.580(3) (1985) (five or fewer); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 45-24-23 (Supp. 1987) (eight or fewer); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-7-830 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987) (nine or fewer); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-24-102 (1980) (eight or
fewer); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1011n, §§ 3(b), 4 (Vernon Supp. 1988)
(six or fewer); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-2.5(1)(b) (Supp. 1987) (eight or fewer);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4409(d) (Supp. 1987) (six or fewer); W. VA. CODE
§ 27-17-1 (1986) (eight or fewer); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.97(15)(c) (West Supp. 1987)
(eight or fewer).
42. See infra note 55-57 and accompanying text.
43. HAW. REV. STAT. § 321.15.6(b)(2) (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 443.580(3)
(1985).
44. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-582(A) (1986); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5116 (West 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-3e(a) (West Supp. 1987); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:477(1) (West Supp. 1987); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 125.216a(2), 125.583b(2) (West 1986); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.021(2) (Michie
Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-21 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-16-14(2)
(Supp. 1985); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1011n, §§ 3(b), 4 (Vernon Supp.
1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4409(d) (Supp. 1987).
45. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-582(H) (1986) (1,200 feet between resid-
ences); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-115(2)(b), 31-23-303(2)(b) (1977) (750 feet between
residences); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-3f (West Supp. 1987) (1,000 feet between
residences); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4923(c) (Supp. 1986) (5,000 feet between
residences); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-13-21-12 (West Supp. 1986) (3,000 feet between
residences); IOWA CODE ANN. § 358A.25(3) (West Supp. 1987) (1/4 mile between
residences); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:478(B) (West Supp. 1987) (1,000 feet between
residences); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962-A(4) (Supp. 1987) (1,500 feet
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for example, community residences must be located three quarters
of a mile apart;46 in Delaware 5,000 feet apart; 47 and in Detroit,
Michigan, 3,000 feet apart.4 Four states set quotas for the number
of mentally retarded persons that may live in community residences
in a given area. 49 In New Jersey, for example, only fifty persons
or .5 percent of a municipality's population (whichever is greater)
may reside in community residences in a particular municipality.50
Moreover, while some states merely require that agencies seeking to
establish community residences for mentally retarded persons notify
municipalities of their intent to establish residences,51 other state
between residences and no "excessive concentration" of residences); MICH. Corn,.
LAws ANN. §§ 125.216a(4), 125.583b(4) (West 1986) (1,500 feet between residences
but 3,000 feet in cities with population over one million and no excessive con-
centration); NEB. REv. STAT. § 18-1746 (1983) (1,200 feet between residences); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-66.1 (West Supp. 1986) (1,500 feet between residences); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 168-22 (1982) (1/2 mile between residences); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT.
ANN. art. 101In, § 3(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (1/2 mile between residences); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 10-9-2.5(2)(f) (Supp. 1987) (3/4 mile between residences); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 4409(d) (Supp. 1987) (1,000 feet between residences); W. VA. CODE
§ 27-17-2(a) (1986) (1,200 feet between residences outside of municipality); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §. 59.97(15)(a) (West Supp. 1987) (2,500 feet between residences). The
District of Columbia has also enacted regulations placing distance limitations between
residences. See AFTER EIGHT YEARS, supra note 19, at 58; cf. N.Y. MENTAL HYo.
LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (no distance limitation between residences,
but residences not permitted if municipality objects and can demonstrate that
establishment of proposed residence would create overconcentration of similar fa-
cilities that would substantially alter area); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.020(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1988) (municipalities may set "reasonable" density standards).
46. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-2.5(0 (Supp. 1987). .
47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4923(c) (Supp. 1986).
48. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.216a(4), 125.583b(4) (West 1986).
49. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 18-1747 (1983) (one home permitted in municipalities
of 1,000 residents or fewer; one home for every 2,000 residents permitted in
municipalities of 1,001-9,999; one home for every 3,000 residents in municipalities
of 10,000-49,999; one home for every 10,000 residents in municipalities of 50,000-
249,999; one home for every 20,000 residents in municipalities of 250,000 or more);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-66.1 (West Supp. 1986) (50 persons or .5% of municipal
population, whichever is greater); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486.2 (1981) (proportional
to population and population density of state and local subdivisions); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 59.97(15)(b) (West Supp. 1987) (greater of 25 persons or one percent of
municipality's population).
50. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-66.1 (West Supp. 1986).
51. See ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-582(1) (1986) (municipality may object to
proposed site, seek administrative hearing, and bring court actions but statute does
not specify grounds upon which municipality can challenge residence); MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-318 to -319, 7-418 (1982) (municipality can object to proposed
publicly-sponsored residences, but statute does not specify grounds upon which
municipality can base objection); N.Y. MENTAL Hvo. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney
Supp. 1988) (municipality can object only if proposed residence would create
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statutes permit local authorities to place special requirements on
residences declared to be single family dwellings.12 In Colorado, a
municipality can challenge a community residence that is architec-
turally inconsistent with other homes in the area" while in Maine,
a municipality may, in some circumstances, challenge a residence
on the ground that it does not provide convenient access to shopping.14
In states where statutes do not totally pre-empt municipalities from
regulating community residences, municipalities have enacted ordi-
nances that have the effect of excluding some community residences
from areas zoned for single family use. These ordinances accomplish
that purpose by using a restrictive definition of the term "family"
for zoning purposes. For example, in Brewer, Maine, the term
"family" in the zoning ordinance is defined as:
[A] single individual doing his own cooking, and living upon the
premises as a separate housekeeping unit, or a collective body of
persons doing their own cooking and living together upon the
premises as a separate housekeeping unit in a domestic relationship
based upon birth, marriage or other domestic bond as distinguished
from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house, club,
fraternity or hotel."
Similarly, the zoning ordinance in Kenner, Louisiana defines "fam-
ily" as:
overconcentration of similar residences resulting in substantial alteration of area,
and it can suggest alternative site); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.19(k)(l) (Anderson
Supp. 1986) (notification of municipalities required, but no grounds stated for
municipality objection to residence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-7-830(a) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1987) (municipality has opportunity to name alternate site).
52. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-115(2)(c) (1977), 31-23-303(3) (Supp. 1984)
(municipality permitted to challenge community residence if it is architecturally
inconsistent with other homes in area or provides treatment services inconsistent
with rest of community or is sited in area lacking community services such as
shopping, hospitals and public recreation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962-
A(3)(B) (Supp. 1987) (municipality in some circumstances can challenge residence
if it creates traffic hazard, hampers pedestrian circulation, violates local building
codes and fails to provide convenient access to shopping, medical, fire and police
services); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.020(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (municipality permitted
to regulate distances between community residences in area and can require that
exterior appearance of residence conforms to other residences in area); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-20-305 (1987) (local control permitted over residences); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-21-1(C) (1985) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-2.5 (1986 & Supp. 1987) (same);
see also W. VA. CODE §§ 8-24-50b(a) (Supp. 1987), 27-17-2(a) (1986) (statute unclear
as to whether community residences for seven or eight persons must obtain permit
before operation).
53. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-115(3) (1977), 31-23-303(3) (Supp. 1984).
54. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962-A(3)(B) (Supp. 1987).
55. Brewer, Me., Zoning Ordinance, art. 1, § 101, quoted in Penobscot Area
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 20 (Me. 1981).
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[A]n individual or two or more persons who are related.by blood
or marriage living together and occupying a single house-keeping
unit with single culinary facilities, or a group of not more than
four persons living together by joint agreement and occupying a
single housekeeping unit with single culinary facilities on a non-
profit, cost sharing basis. Domestic servants employed and residing
on the premises shall be considered as part of the family. 6
Courts have enjoined the establishment of community residences in
single family areas in these two cities on the ground that the residences
did not come within the ordinances' definitions of the term "family. ,5 7
IV. City of Cleburne: Equal Protection
for the Mentally Retarded
A. The Equal Protection Clause and Mentally Retarded Persons
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
that no state "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 5 8 In other words, a state or entity engaged
in "state action"5 9 must treat all similarly situated persons alike. 60
In general, however, statutes treating certain classifications of persons
differently from others will be upheld if they are rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. 6' For example, differential treatment
of persons based upon age is permissible if rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. 6
2
56. Kenner, La., Zoning Ordinance § 6.02, quoted in City of Kenner v. Normal
Life of Louisiana, Inc., 483 So. 2d 903, 904-05 (La. 1986) (emphasis omitted).
57. See, e.g., Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d
14 (Me. 1981); City of Kenner v. Normal Life of Louisiana, Inc., 483 So. 2d 903
(La. 1986).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. The city in City of Cleburne failed to assert that its attempted enforcement
of the zoning ordinance was not "state action." See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
60. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (undocumented resident
aliens).
61. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (congressional
exclusion from reduced Supplemental Security Income benefits of mentally ill patients
in certain public institutions not equal protection violation under rational basis
standard); United States Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980)
(reasonable basis for distinction drawn between groups of railroad employees for
windfall benefits eligibility insulates § 231b(h) of Railroad Retirement Act of 1974
from equal protection challenge).
62. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
(rational basis exists for statute mandating state police officer retirement at age
50).
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The general rule that to be upheld, statutes treating classes of
persons differently must be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, does not apply to classifications by race, alienage and national
origin. 63 Because these factors are virtually never relevant to the
accomplishment of any legitimate state interest, statutes treating
individuals differently on the basis of their race, alienage and national
origin are subject to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if
they serve a compelling state interest. 64 These classifications are more
commonly known as "suspect" categories. 61 Statutes treating persons
differently because of gender or illegitimacy also call for a heightened
standard of review because those classifications generally do not
provide a sensible ground for disparate treatment. 66 A gender or
illegitimacy classification will be stricken unless it is substantially
related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. 67 These
classifications are generally known as "quasi-suspect" categories. 61
City of Cleburne specifically addressed the question whether mental
retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification .69 In determining whether
a classification is "quasi-suspect," thus requiring a heightened
standard of scrutiny, courts examine whether the group has distin-
guishing characteristics that legislatures may properly take into
account 70 as well as whether there is a history of discrimination and
prejudice against the group.71 With regard to mental retardation,
the record before the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne demon-
strated that mentally retarded persons have distinguishing char-
acteristics that legislatures have legitimately taken into account 72 and
that there is a history of prejudice and discrimination against mentally
retarded persons. 73
63. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race).
64. See supra note 63. Courts will also view with strict scrutiny statutes that
impinge on fundamental personal rights of individuals. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
65. See supra note 63.
66. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)(gender); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (illegitimacy).
67. See supra note 66.
68. Id.
69. 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985).
70. Cf. id. at 446 (fact that "mental retardation is a characteristic that the govern-
ment may legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions" militates against
elevating mentally retarded to quasi-suspect classification).
71. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-86; see also City of Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 461-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443-45.
73. Id. at 461-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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B. City of Cleburne Decision
The Cleburne Court did not find, however, that mentally retarded
persons constitute a "quasi-suspect" category. 74 Nonetheless, the
Court invalidated a municipal zoning ordinance that prohibited homes
74. Id. at 442-47. In finding that mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect
classification, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals's holding that mental
retardation was a "quasi-suspect" classification because of the history of mistreat-
ment of mentally retarded persons resulting in deep-seated prejudice and discrim-
ination against them, the powerlessness of such persons in the political arena and
the irreversibility of the condition of mentally retarded persons. Cleburne Living
Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In justifying its holding that mental retardation
was not a "quasi-suspect" classification, the Court found that mentally retarded
persons have unique and special problems that have been addressed by legislatures
in non-prejudicial and beneficial ways and that mentally retarded persons were thus
not powerless in the political arena. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-47. In
dissent, Justice Marshall wrote that mentally retarded persons should be considered
a "quasi-suspect" classification because of a documented history of prejudice against
such persons. Id. at 461-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Several articles have been written on the Supreme Court's holding that mentally
retarded persons do not constitute a "quasi-suspect" category. See generally Mar-
gulies, The Newest Equal Protection: City of Cleburne and a Common Law for
Statutes and Covenants Affecting Group Homes for the Mentally Disabled, 3 HuM.
RTS. ANN. 359 (1986); Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for
the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111 (1987); Note, A Changing Equal Protection Standard?
The Supreme Court's Application of a Heightened Rational Basis Test in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 20 Loy. L.A.L.. REv. 921 (1987); Note, A
House is Not a Home: City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 6 PACE L.
REv. 267 (1986); Note, Constitutional Law: City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center In Search of Equal Protection: Are the Mentally Retarded Lost in Won-
derland?, 54 UMKC L. REV. 541 (1986); Note, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center: Rational Basis With a Bite?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 927 (1986); Note, City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center: Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status for the
Mentally Retarded and its Effect on Exclusionary Zoning of Group Homes, 17 U.
TOL. L. REv. 1041 (1986); Comment, The City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center and The Supreme Court: Two Minorities Move Toward Acceptance, 63
DEN. U.L. REV. 697 (1986); Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded:
A Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
72 IOWA L. REv. 241 (1986); Comment, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.: Judicial Step or Stumble?, 6 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 409 (1986); Comment,
Equal Protection and the New Rational Basis Test: The Mentally Retarded are not
Second Class Citizens in Cleburne, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 333 (1986); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Mental Retardation Is Not A Quasi-Suspect
Classification; Therefore, Classifications On That Basis Are Subject To Rational
Relation Limitations, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 1053 (1986); Comment, City of Cleburne,
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.: The Mentally Retarded And The Demise
of Intermediate Scrutiny, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 349 (1986); Comment, Constitutional
Law: Although Mentally Retarded Not a Quasi-Suspect Class, Denial of Special
Use Permit Deprived Applicants of Constitutional Right [City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985)], 25 WASHBURN L.J. 575 (1986).
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for mentally retarded persons while allowing other similar homes
on the ground that the ordinance's differential treatment of mentally
retarded persons was not rationally related to any legitimate municipal
interest.75
. In 1980, Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. (CLC or the Center) leased
property in the City of Cleburne, Texas for the purpose of operating
a supervised community residence for thirteen mentally retarded
persons. 76 The home was located in a zone permitting (without a
special permit) apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and
lodging houses, fraternity and sorority houses, dormitories, apartment
hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes and homes for con-
valescents and the elderly (other than for the insane or feebleminded)
and some private clubs and fraternal orders. 77
The city classified the proposed group home as a "hospital for
the feebleminded ' 78 and therefore required CLC to obtain a special
permit for the operation of the residence. 79 When CLC's application
for a permit was denied,80 the Center filed suit against the city in
federal district court.8' CLC's complaint alleged that the zoning
ordinance was invalid because it discriminated against the mentally
retarded in violation of the federal equal protection rights of the
Center and its future residents.8 2
The Supreme Court invalidated the zoning ordinance as applied
to the CLC home.83 Unlike the court of appeals, the Court refused
to recognize mental retardation as a "quasi-suspect" class.8 4 The
Court therefore applied the rational basis test 85 to determine whether
requiring the special use permit for the Center while not requiring
75. 473 U.S. at 447-50.
76. Id. at 435.
77. Id. at 436 n.3.
78. Id. at 436-37.
79. Id. at 436.
80. Id. at 437.
81. Id. The district court ruled in favor of the city. Applying the rational basis
test, the district court found the ordinance to be rationally related to the city's
legitimate interests in "the legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, . . . the
safety and fears of residents in the adjoining :neighborhood," and the number of
persons to be housed in the residence. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 447-50. For further discussion of the impact of City of Cleburne on
zoning ordinances, see Note, Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, -The
Irrational Relationship of Mental Retardation to Zoning Objectives, 19 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 469 (1986); Note, Zoning for Land Users and Not Land Use, 16 STETSON
L. REV. 165 (1986).
84. 473 U.S. at 442-47; see supra note 74.
85. 473 U.S. at 442-47.
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a similar permit for other similar homes violated the equal protection
rights of future CLC residents. 6 The Court found that the record
did not demonstrate that the CLC home would "pose any special
threat to the city's legitimate interests" 7 and held that the ordinance
was invalid."8
The Supreme Court rejected the city's attempts to justify the
rationality of the ordinance's application. 9 First, the Court concluded
that negative attitudes and unsubstantiated fears were not sufficient
reasons for the city treating the home for mentally retarded persons
differently from apartment houses and other multiple dwellings. 90
Second, the Court rejected the city's objections to the residence's
location near a school and on a "five-hundred-year flood plain," 9'
because neither the fear that some of the students could harass CLC
residents nor the possibility of a flood justified a distinction between
the community residence and other permitted uses. 92 Similarly, the
Court rejected the argument that the city was uncertain about its
potential responsibility for actions that the CLC residents might
take. 93 The Court noted that it was hard to believe that the retarded
residents would present any more of a hazard than persons living
in permitted uses such as boarding and fraternity houses. 94 Finally,
the Court dismissed the city's allegations regarding the size of the
home and the number of persons that would occupy it.91 Observing
that there were no restrictions on the number of persons who could
occupy a boarding home, nursing home, family dwelling, fraternity
house or dormitory, the Court found that the record did not justify
different treatment of a home for retarded persons.9 Writing for
the Court, Justice White concluded "that requiring the permit in
86. Id. Because the proposed residence would not be located in a single-family
zone, the case failed to pose the question whether the residences should be treated
like other single family residences.
87. Id. at 448.
88. Id. at 450.
89. Id. at 448-50.
90. Id. at 448.
91. Id. at 449. A "five-hundred-year flood plain" is a topographical area in
which a flood is expected every 500 years. See Cleburne Living Center v. City of
Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 202 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 473
U.S. 432 (1985).
92. 473 U.S. at 449.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 449-50.
95. Id. at 450.
96. Id.
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this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded." 97
V. Viability of State Statutes and. Local Ordinances in Light of
City of Cleburne
As a result of the Court's decision in City of Cleburne, community
residences for mentally retarded persons cannot be subjected to rules
and regulations not imposed on other similar residences unless those
rules and regulations are rationally related to a legitimate interest. 98
In order to justify a statute or ordinance treating community re-
sidences for mentally retarded persons differently from other similar
residences, a governmental body must demonstrate that there are
real and undeniable differences between community residences for
mentally retarded persons and other residences and that such dis-
parate treatment serves a legitimate interest. 99
A. City of Cleburne's Impact on State Statutes
After the decision in City of Cleburne, many state statutes that
impede the establishment of community residences may be uncon-
stitutional. Particularly suspect are statutes that: (1) limit the number
of persons that may reside in a community residence in single family
zones;'00 (2) place distance limitations 01 or quotas'0 2 on community
residences; and (3) permit municipalities to place special limitations
on community residences not required of other similar homes. 03
1. Numerical Limitations
Although City of Cleburne does not directly address this issue,' °4
specific language in the decision indicates that numerical limitations
may be constitutionally invalid. In City of Cleburne, the city con-
tended that the requirement of a special use permit was rational
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text; infra notes 104-20 and
accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text; infra notes 121-28 and
accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text; infra notes 122-28 and
accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
104. The Cleburne home was located in an "Apartment House District" and
not a single family zone. 473 U.S. at 436 n.3.
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because of the number of people who would be housed in the
proposed community residence. 05 After noting that there were no
restrictions on the number of persons that could occupy other per-
mitted uses within the zone, the Court rejected the argument, holding:
It is true that [the mentally retarded] suffer disability not shared
by others; but why this difference warrants a density regulation
that others need not observe is not at all apparent. At least this
record does not clarify how, in this connection, the characteristics
of the intended occupants of the . . . home . . . justify denying
to those occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying
the same site for different purposes.' °6
This language thus suggests that when a state legislature has permitted
community residences to be placed in single family or residential
zones, it cannot place any limits on the number of persons who
may reside in such residences. Such a numerical limitation can be
upheld only if the state can demonstrate that there is a rational
basis for placing limits on the number of residents in a community
residence for retarded persons that differs from limits placed on
other single family or residential units. 0 7 Considering the strong
nationwide public policy favoring the establishment of residences °
and the evidence demonstrating that community residences do not
have any substantial negative effect on neighborhoods,' °9 states may
have a difficult time justifying statutes limiting the number of men-
tally retarded persons residing in community residences.
Moreover, the Court's strong language in City of Cleburne over-
rides two other arguments that may be posited in favor of the
constitutionality of numerical limitations. One argument is that men-
tally retarded persons are better served in smaller community resid-
ences." 0 The fact that mentally retarded persons may be best served
105. Id. at 449-50. The proposed home consisted of 2700 square feet intended
to house 13 people. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191,
202 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
106. 473 U.S. at 449-50.
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 8-25 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
110. See M. JANICKI, PERSONAL GROWTH AND COMMUNITY RESIDENCE ENVIRON-
MENTS: A REvIEW 35-37 (Living Alternatives Research Project 1981) (available at
Fordham Urban Law Journal office) (studies favoring limits on number of persons
permitted to reside in community residences). In rejecting the application of a
heightened scrutiny test to the ordinance in City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court
noted that many statutes recognizing the unique problems of mentally retarded
persons are passed to benefit such persons and that a heightened scrutiny test
1988]
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in smaller residences, however, does not mean that larger residences
are not viable. In fact, expert testimony in the City of Cleburne
trial indicated that community residences with up to fifteen residents
tend to work as well as those for six or fewer residents."'
A second argument can be made that setting the number of mentally
retarded persons permitted in a residence in a single family zone is
an exercise of legislative discretion not reviewable by courts. In
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,12 the Supreme Court adopted this
position in upholding the validity of a zoning ordinance limiting to
two, the number of unrelated persons allowed to live in a single
family zone" 3 over an argument that the numerical limitation was
arbitrary.1 4 The zoning ordinance found constitutional in Village of
Belle Terre, however, _differs from a limitation on the number of
mentally retarded persons that may live together in a community
residence in a single family zone. The zoning ordinance does not
have a discriminatory purpose-it treats all persons alike." 5 In con-
trast, by declaring that community residences for mentally retarded
persons are single family and residential uses and then placing nu-
merical limitations on such residences not imposed upon other single
family and residential uses, state legislatures appear to be treating
mentally retarded persons differently from other persons. It would
might discourage legislatures from enacting such statutes; 473 U.S. at 443-45.
The City of Cleburne Court later noted, however, that its refusal to recognize
the retarded as a quasi-suspect class "does not leave them entirely unprotected
from invidious discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legislation that
distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related
to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 446.
111. 726 F.2d 191, 202 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 473 U.S.
432 (1985).
112. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Village of Belle Terre involved a residence for six college
students. Id. at 2.
113. Id. at 2-10. City of Cleburne did not overrule Village of Belle Terre.
Moreover, the City of Cleburne Court cites Village of Belle Terre with implicit
approval in distinguishing City of Cleburne from Macon Association for Retarded
Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 314
S.E.2d 218, appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 802 (1984). See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S.
at 439 n.8. Macon Association involved a challenge to a local ordinance similar
to that challenged in Village of Belle Terre. See Macon Ass'n, 252 Ga. at 485-86,
314 S.E.2d at 220.
114. 416 U.S. at 8. Although the Supreme Court in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), invalidated a zoning ordinance that attempted.to
limit the types of blood relatives who could live together in a single family zone,
the Court found that the ordinance in Moore was excessively intrusive and was
thus distinguishable from that in Village of Belle Terre. Id. at 499-500.
115. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 n.8.
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be difficult for a state to compile a record justifying this disparate
treatment. 1
1 6
Moreover, language in Village of Belle Terre itself supports an
argument that such numerical limitations impair a statute's viability
in light of City of Cleburne. In Village of Belle Terre, the Court
cited with approval a dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes' 17 which
noted that "the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless
we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark.""' 8 As
discussed previously, however, published studies indicate that com-
munity residences pose no threat to communities." 9 Thus, it can be
argued that because there are no limitations on the number of persons
residing in traditional families in single family and residential zones,
a legislature's imposition of a numerical limitation on the number
of retarded persons living in a community residence is in fact "very
wide of any reasonable mark.' ' 20
2. Distance Limitations and Quotas
Some state statutes require that community residences be placed
at specified distances from one another.' 2 ' Others impose quotas on
the number of persons that may live in community residences within
a certain municipality. 22 Because such statutes do not place distance
limitations on other residences (or even institutions) within an area
and do not set quotas on other persons living in similar types of
residences in an area, these statutes are invalid after City of Cle-
burne.2 1 Considering that community residences pose no threat to
their neighbors, 24 states will be extremely hard-pressed to formulate
rational reasons as to why distances should exist between community
residences or why there should be quotas on the number of retarded
persons living in residences in a community. While an argument can
be made that community residences should be separated to avoid
116. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
117. 416 U.S. at 8 n.5 (citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S.
32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
118. Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
119. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 118.
121. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
123. 473 U.S. at 449-50.
124. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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the "ghettoization' '1 25 of mentally retarded persons, distance limi-
tations of one-fifth of a mile to one mile between residences126 or
quotas limiting mentally retarded persons in residences to one-half
of one percent of the population 27 would hardly seem to serve that
purpose. In any event, a distance limit between residences without
regard to the topography or nature of an area is arbitrary, especially
in large, vertical cities. 128
3. Notification to Communities and the Necessity of Community
Approval
While it is unlikely that City of Cleburne invalidates statutes
requiring notification of the presence of community residences to
communities provided there is a rational basis for such notification,
the rationale of that decision challenges state statutes which mandate
greater municipal control over community residences than over other
single family dwellings.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne, an
appellate court in New York upheld a statute which declared that
community residences were single family dwellings 29 but required
sponsoring agencies of community residences to give notification to
municipalities of their intent to establish residences. 30 In Di Biase
v. Piscitelli,'3' the appellate division rejected a sponsoring agency's
claim that the statute violated the equal protection clause 3 2 and
125. NEW YORK STATE SENATE MENTAL HYGIENE AND ADDICTION CONTROL COMM.,
SITE SELECTION OF COMMUNITY RESIDENCES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE AND LEGISLATION 26-27 (1979) (available at Fordham Urban .Law
Journal office) [hereinafter SITE SELECTION STUDY].
126. See supra note 45.
127. See supra note 49.
128. SITE SELECTION STUDY, supra note 125, at 35-36 (New York State's site
selection law did not include distance limitations or quotas on theory that former
were inflexible in their application and latter were potentially unconstitutional).
Michigan's statute, which imposes greater distance limitations on community re-
sidences in Detroit than in other parts of that state, seems particularly irrational.
Compare MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 125.216a(2) (West 1986) with MICH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 125.583b(4) (West 1986); cf. W. VA. CODE § 27-17-2 (1986) (distance
limitations inapplicable in larger municipalities).
129. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (sponsoring
agency must inform municipality of its interest in establishing community residence
within municipality's boundaries).
130. Di Biase v. Piscitelli, 87 A.D.2d 611, 611-12, 448 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (2d
Dep't), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 672, 439 N.E.2d 1248, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1034
(1982).
131. 87 A.D.2d 611, 448 N.Y.S.2d 35 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d
672, 439 N.E.2d 1248, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1982).
132. Id. at 611-12, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
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discriminated against mentally retarded persons."' Relying on the
same rational basis test later used by the Supreme Court in City
of Cleburne, the appellate division held that the statute was rea-
sonably related to the policy sought to be implemented-facilitation
of the establishment of community residences by encouraging dis-
cussion about sites between communities and sponsors. 1 4
Because the Di Biase court applied the same rational basis test
later used by the Supreme Court, Di Biase is still viable and its
rationale would likely be applicable to other state statutes requiring
notification to municipalities. Thus, unless a notification statute is
unduly onerous to a sponsoring agency seeking to establish a com-
munity residence, it is probable that a court would find that the
statute has a rational basis tied to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Such a statute would likely be upheld in spite of City of Cleburne
and in spite of the fact that it would impose different conditions
on community residences for mentally retarded persons than on other
similar residences.
On the other hand, using equal protection arguments similar to
those raised in City of Cleburne, the Louisiana Supreme Court found
unconstitutional a statute that required only community residences
for mentally retarded persons to solicit governmental approval before
operating. 3 ' In Clark v. Manuel,3 6 the court held that the statute
was not substantially related to any legitimate governmental pur-
pose. 37 Rejecting the argument that the statute was aimed at avoiding
133. Id.
134. Id. The appellate division noted:
[Oin its face, . . . the challenged statute is patently designed to encourage
the establishment and licensing of community residential facilities for
persons formerly served in [sitate institutions and to insure that providers
of care establish such facilities with the participation of local communities
in site selection .... By amending the Mental Hygiene Law, the [liegislature
expressed a public policy that the needs of the mentally disabled should
be met through the concept of group homes in community settings chosen
through a process of joint discussion and accomodation between the
providers of care and services to the mentally disabled and representatives
of the community. Section 41.34 of the Mental Hygiene Law [Padavan
Law] is rationally related to the public policy sought to be implemented
by the [1]egislature, and to that extent, is constitutional. ...
Id.
The rational basis test had been applied in New York to statutes involving
handicapped persons prior to Di Biase. See, e.g., Levy v. City of New York, 38
N.Y.2d 653, 658, 345 N.E.2d 556, 558, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15, appeal dismissed,
429 U.S. 805 (1976).
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concentrations of population and congestion in the street, 3 ' the court
noted that "[i]f the occupants were not mentally retarded, the same
house with the same number of residents and even with the same
number of potential drivers would be a permitted use." 13 9 Although
the Clark court relied upon the circuit court decision in City of
Cleburne holding that mentally retarded persons are a "quasi-sus-
pect" class and that the heightened scrutiny test was thus applicable,'"
the court's decision leaves no doubt that it would still invalidate
the statute under the rational basis test used by the Court in City
of Cleburne.
B. City of Cleburne and Local Ordinances
While the decision in City of Cleburne would affect state statutes
treating community residences for mentally retarded persons differ-
ently from other similar homes,'14 the decision would not have a
similar impact on local ordinances containing a definition of the
term "family" which, although restrictive, applied to everyone. 42
Some courts have found that community residences are single
family or residential dwellings for the purpose of local laws and
ordinances even in the absence of a state statute declaring community
residences to be single family dwellings. 143 When no state statute
138. Id. The court expressly noted that the state legislature had recognized that
"mental retardation/development disability does not in and of itself pose a threat
to the safety and security of a community or the individual." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1284-86. The court used the "heightened scrutiny" test on the grounds
that mentally retarded persons were the subject of historical prejudice and pow-
erlessness and that the statute in question made it difficult for mentally retarded
persons to live in the community and thus enjoy an important right. Id. at 1285.
The court noted the Louisiana statute declaring that mentally handicapped persons
were entitled to reside "in their own community and in normal residential sur-
roundings." Id. at 1285 n.14; see supra note 17.
141. 473 U.S. at 449-50.
142. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text; infra notes 143-51 and
accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12
(1977); Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (Conn. C.P.
'1974); City of College Park v. Flynn, 248 Ga. 222, 282 S.E.2d 69 (1981); Douglas
County Resources, Inc. v. Daniel, 247 Ga. 785, 280 S.E.2d 734 (1981); Linn County
v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1981); Hamner v. Best, 656 S.W.2d
253 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Tucker v. Special Children's Found., Inc., 449 So. 2d
45 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d 959 (1984); City of West Monroe v.
Ouachita Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., 402 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1981);
Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981); Region 10 Client
Management, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 120 N.H. 885, 424 A.2d 207 (1980);
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exists, however, community residences often have a difficult time
overcoming local ordinances that merely limit the number of un-
related persons that may live in a residence in a single family or
residential zone."' This type of local ordinance was found not to
violate the federal due process clause by the Supreme Court in
Village of Belle Terre.145 In a footnote in its decision in City of
Cleburne,14 6 the Court noted that the principles of Village of Belle
Terre did not apply to City of Cleburne because unlike the ordinance
in City of Cleburne, the type of ordinance challenged in Village of
Belle Terre did not discriminate against mentally retarded persons.1
47
White v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 6 Ohio St; 3d 68, 451 N.E.2d 756 (1983);
Freedom Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Portage County, 16 Ohio App. 3d
387, 476 N.E.2d 360 (1984); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985);
JALC Real Estate v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 104 Pa. Commw. 605, 522 A.2d 710
(1987); Hopkins v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 55 Pa. Commw. 365, 423 A.2d 1082
(1980); Children's Home of Easton v. City of Easton, 53 Pa. Commw. 216, 417
A.2d 830 (1980); Collins v. City of El Campo, 684 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984). A particularly interesting case is Fitchburg Housing Authority v. Board of
Zoning Appeals of Fitchburg, 380 Mass. 869, 406 N.E.2d 1006 (1980), in which
the court held that the zoning ordinance could not be used to block a community
residence in light of a statute prohibiting zoning ordinances from barring the use
of land for educational purposes. Id. at 875, 406 N.E.2d at 1010; see also Allegheny
Valley School v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 102 Pa. Commw. 290, 291, 517 A.2d 1385,
1389 (1986) (community residence deemed to be "charitable institution" permissible
under zoning ordinance).
144. A number of courts have held that community residences do not fall within
the definition of the term "family" for the purpose of local zoning ordinances.
See, e.g., Civitans Care, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Huntsville, 437 So. 2d
540 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983); Roundup Found., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of
Denver, 626 P.2d 1154 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens
v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 314 S.E.2d 218,
appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 802 (1984); Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505
N.E.2d 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); City of Kenner v. Normal Life of Louisiana,
Inc., 483 So. 2d 903 (La. 1986); Zoning Bd. of City of Hammond v. Tangipahoa
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 510 So. 2d 751 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Normal Life
of Louisiana, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish Dep't of Inspection & Code Enforcement,
483 So. 2d 1123 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Penobscot Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City
of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981); Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio
St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1980); Culp v.
City of Seattle, 22 Wash. App. 618, 590 P.2d 1288 (1979).
145. 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974). The Village of Belle Terre ordinance defined family
as "one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants.
A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption or marriage shall
be deemed to constitute a family." Id. at 2.
146. 473 U.S. at 439 n.8.
147. Id. The Court noted:
Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and
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The court of appeals in Louisiana followed City of Cleburne in
holding that the principles applicable to statutes and ordinances that
treated community residences differently from other similar types of
residences did not apply to a nondiscriminatory ordinance that had
the effect of excluding a residence. 41 In Normal Life of Louisiana,
Inc. v. Jefferson Parish Department of Inspection and Code En-
forcement,149 the court upheld a municipality's decision to block the
establishment of a community residence in an area zoned to prohibit
more than four unrelated persons living together. 150 The court noted:
This situation is the opposite of that found in City of Cleburne,
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center ... in which no special use
permit was required for the operation of multiple dwellings, board-
ing houses, etc., except for that of the defendant. There, the
[Supreme Court] decided that the City of Cleburne could not
require a permit for such a facility for the handicapped when
other similar facilities were freely permitted.
... [Here], any owner or lessor in Jefferson Parish is required
to secure approval of a local governing authority before attempting
a special use, exception or variance.
The statute as applied to the facts of this case does not violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution since it creates no
material distinction between the plaintiff [sponsoring agency of
community residence] and any similarly situated party under the
zoning laws.'
Thus, City of Cleburne does not provide a basis for invalidating
zoning ordinances that do not specifically discriminate against men-
Zoning Comm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 314 S.E.2d 218 (1984), dism'd for want
of a substantial federal question, 469 U.S. 802 ... (1984), has no
controlling effect on this case. Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens involved
an ordinance that had the effect of excluding a group home for the
retarded only because it restricted dwelling units to those occupied by
a single family, defined as no more than four unrelated persons. In
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 . .. (1974), we upheld the
consititutionality of a similar ordinance, and the Georgia Supreme Court
in Macon Ass'n specifically held that the ordinance did not discriminate
against the retarded. 252 Ga. at 487, 314 S.E.2d at 221.
Id.
148. Normal Life of Louisiana, Inc. v. Jefferson County Parish Dep't of In-
spection & Code Enforcement, 483 So. 2d 1123, 1126-27 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1127. The Jefferson Parish ordinance defined "family" as "one or
more persons related by blood or marriage living together and occupying a single
housekeeping unit with single culinary facilities or a group of not more than four
persons living together by mutual agreement and occupying a single housekeeping
unit with single culinary facilities on a non-profit cost sharing basis." Id. at 1125.
151. Id. at 1126-27.
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tally retarded persons. The due process clauses of state constitutions,
however, can provide a sound basis for challenging such ordinances.
Courts have overturned statutes and ordinances that do not violate
the federal due process clause on the ground that they violate a
state's due process clause. 152
For example, in McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay,"3 the New York
Court of Appeals voided a town's zoning ordinance prohibiting more
than two unrelated persons under the age of sixty-two from residing
in a single family zone'54 on the ground that it violated the due
process clause of the New York State Constitution.' In McMinn,
which concerned four unrelated non-retarded men between the ages
of twenty-two and twenty-five residing in a house in a single family
zone, 56 the court noted that in order for a zoning ordinance to be
valid under the New York State Constitution, it must have been
enacted "in furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose"' 57
with "a reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved
by the regulation and the means used to achieve that end."' 8 After
finding that the ordinance was enacted to further legitimate gov-
ernmental purposes,1'9 the court then held-that restricting occupancy
of single family housing based upon biological or legal relationship
bore no reasonable relation to the legitimate goals of "reducing
parking and traffic problems, controlling population density and
preventing noise and disturbance."' 16 The McMinn court then found
that the ordinance did not bear a reasonable relationship to the
town's desire to preserve the character of traditional single family
neighborhoods, holding that "a municipality may not seek to achieve
it['s] [goals] by enacting a zoning ordinance that 'limit[s] the def-
inition of family to exclude a household which in every but a
biological sense is a single family.' ",161 Consequently, finding that
152. See infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text.
153. 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985).
154. Id, at 547-48, 488 N.E.2d at 1241-42, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30.
155. Id. at 552, 488 N.E.2d at 1244, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
156. Id. at 548, 488 N.E.2d at 1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
157. Id. at 549, 488 N.E.2d at 1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 549, 488 N.E.2d at 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
160. Id. The court noted that the definition of family in the ordinance was
fatally overinclusive in prohibiting an unmarried couple from living in a four-
bedroom house and underinclusive in failing to prohibit the occupancy of a two-
bedroom house by 10 or 12 distantly related persons. Id. at 549-50, 488 N.E.2d
at 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
161. Id. at 550, 488 N.E.2d at 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131 (quoting City of White
Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 306, 313 N.E.2d 756, 759, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449,
453 (1974))..
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there was no reasonable relation between the ends sought to be
achieved by the town's ordinance and the means used to achieve
that end, the court invalidated the ordinance under the due process
clause of the New York State Constitution. 162
Using the principles delineated in McMinn, courts in California,1 63
Michigan1 6 and New Jersey' 65 have invalidated local ordinances lim-
iting the number of unrelated persons that may live in single family
zones. The McMinn holding thus should be applicable to establish
community residences where state statutes are nonexistent or inap-
plicable and local ordinances limit the number of unrelated persons
that may live together in a single family zone.
VI. Inadequacies of the American Bar Association Model Statute
Sharing the concerns expressed by the federal government and
state governments about the adequacy of the care and treatment of
162. Id. at 552, 488 N.E.2d at 1244, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 132. New York leads the
present trend in which state courts have interpreted their own constitutions more
expansively than federal courts have interpreted the United States Constitution. See
Kaye Sees 'New Federalism' Return to Intent of Founders, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1987,
at 1, col. 3 (speech by Judge Judith Kaye of New York Court of Appeals noting
increased use of state constitutional provisions to overturn statutes and governmental
practices). Compare Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 498, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344,
504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986) (administrative review procedure granted to involuntarily
committed mental patients upon refusal of anti-psychotic medication violates due
process guarantee of New York State Constitution) with Project Release, Inc. v.
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 981 (2d Cir. 1983) (same administrative review procedure
granted to involuntarily committed mental patients upon refusal of anti-psychotic
medication valid under federal Constitution). See also People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,
68 N.Y.2d 296, 299, 501 N.E.2d 556, 558, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (1986) (search
and seizure of pornographic materials violated New York State Constitution which
"imposes a more exacting standard for issuance of search warrants authorizing the
seizure of allegedly obscene material than does the [flederal Constitution"); Bellanca
v. New York State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 235-37, 429 N.E.2d 765, 768-
69, 445 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90-91 (1981) (New York statutory ban on topless dancing
valid under federal Constitution is unconstitutional under state constitution), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982). But see SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66
N.Y.2d 496, 499-500, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1213, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (1985) (declining
to interpret New York State Constitution differently from United States Constitution
in area of free speech).
163. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 134, 610 P.2d 436,
442, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 545 (1980) (ordinance violates California Constitution).
164. Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 270-72, 351 N.W.2d
831, 840-41 (1984) (ordinance violates due process clause of Michigan Constitution).
165. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 113-14, 405 A.2d 368, 375 (1979) (ordinance
violates due process clause of New Jersey Constitution). But see Penobscot Area
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 24 & n.9 (Me. 1981) (refusing
to interpret Maine Constitution differently from United States Constitution and
holding zoning ordinance's definition of family constitutional in light of Village
of Belle Terre); see also City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745, 752 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) (Village of Belle Terre principles applicable to challenge of zoning
ordinance under state constitution.)
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the mentally retarded, 66 the American Bar Association Commission
on the Mentally Disabled has attempted to formulate a model statute
to govern and facilitate the establishment of community residences
for mentally retarded persons. 67 That statute, proposed in the late
166. See supra notes 8-25 and accompanying text.
167. The model statute appears in Hopperton, A State Legislative Strategy for
Ending Exclusionary Zoning of Community Homes, 19 URB. L. ANN. 47, 77-80
(1980). It provides as follows:
MODEL STATUTE
An Act To Establish The Right To Locate Community Homes For
Developmentally Disabled Persons In The Residential Neighborhoods Of
This State
Section 1. Title
This act shall be known as the "Location Act for Community Homes
for Developmentally Disabled Persons."
Section 2. Statement of Purpose
The general assembly declares that it is the goal of this act to improve
the quality of life of all developmentally disabled persons and to integrate
developmentally disabled persons into the mainstream of society by en-
suring them the availability of community residential opportunities in the
residential areas of this state. In order to implement this goal, this act
should be liberally construed toward that end.
Section 3. Definitions
As used in this act:
(1) "Developmental Disability" means a disability of a person which:
(a)(i) is attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or
autism;
(ii) is attributable to any other condition found to be closely related
to mental retardation because such condition results in similar impairment
of general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior to that of mentally
retarded persons or requires treatment and services similar to those
required for such persons; or
(iii) is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability described
in clause (i) or (ii) of this paragraph; and (b) has continued or can be
expected to continue indefinitely.
(2) "Developmentally Disabled Person" means a person with a de-
velopmental disability.
(3) "Director" means the director of developmental disabilities (or
appropriate state official).
(4) "Family Home" means a community-based residential home licensed
by the director that provides room and board, personal care, habilitation
services, and superision in a family environment for not more than
[six(6)] developmentally disabled persons.
(5) "Permitted Use" means a use by right which is authorized in all
residential zoning districts.
(6) "Political Subdivision" means a municipal corporation, township
or county.
Section 4. Permitted Use for Family Homes
A family home is a residential use of property for the purposes of
zoning and shall be treated as a permitted use in all residential zones
or districts, including all single-family residential zones or districts, of
all political subdivisions. No political subdivision may require that a
1988]
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1970's, was entitled "An Act to Establish the Right to Locate
family home, its owner, or operator obtain a conditional use permit,
special use permit-'special exception, or variance.
Section 5. Licensing Regulations and Density Control for Family Homes
(1) For the purposes of safeguarding the health and safety of devel-
opmentally disabled persons and avoiding over-concentration of family
homes, either along or in conjuction with similar community-based re-
sidences, the director or the director's designee shall inspect and license
the operation of family homes and may renew and revoke such licenses.
A license is valid for one year from the date it is issued or renewed
although the director may inspect such homes more frequently, if needed.
The director shall not issue or renew and may revoke the license of a
family home not operating in compliance with this section and regulations
... which shall encompass the following matters:
(a) Limits on the number of new family homes to be permitted on
blocks, block faces, and other appropriate geographic areas taking into
account the existing residential population density and number, occupancy,
and location of similar community residential facilities serving persons
in drug, alcohol, juvenile, child, parole, and other programs of treatment,
care, supervision, or rehabilitation in a community setting;
(b) Assurance that adequate arrangements are made for the residents
of family homes to receive such care and habilitation as is necessary
and appropriate to their needs and to further their progress towards
independent living;
(c) Protection of the health and safety of the residents of family homes,
provided that compliance with these regulations shall not relieve the
owner or operator of any family home of the obligation to comply with
the requirements or standards of a political subdivision pertaining to
building, housing, health, fire, safety, and motor vehicle parking space
that generally apply to single family residences in the zoning district;
and provided further that no requirements for business licenses, gross
receipt taxes, environmental impact studies or clearances may be imposed
on such homes if such fees, taxes, or clearances are not imposed on all
structures in the zoning district housing a like number of persons;(d) Procedures by which any resident of a residential zoning district
or the governing body of a political subdivision in which a family home
is, or is to be, located may petition the director to deny an application
for a license to operate a family home on the grounds that the operation
of such a home would be in violation of the limits established under
paragraph (l)(a) of this section.
(2) All applicants for a license to operate a family home shall apply
to the director for the license and shall file a copy of the application
with the governing body of the political subdivision having jurisdiction
over the zoning of the land on which the family home is to be located.
All applications must include population and occupancy statistics reflecting
compliance with the limits established pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) of
this section.
(3) The Director may not issue a license for a family home until the
applicant has submitted proof of filing with the governing body of the
political subdivision having jurisdiction over the zoning of the land on
which such a home is to be located, a copy of the application at least
thirty (30) days prior to the granting of such a license, and any amendment
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Community Homes for Developmentally Disabled Persons in the
Residential Neighborhoods of this State" (Model Act or the Act).16
The purpose of the Act is "to improve the quality of life of all
developmentally disabled persons and to integrate developmentally
disabled persons into the mainstream of society by ensuring them
the availability of community residential opportunities in the resi-
dential areas of this state.' ' 69 The Model Act provides that only
"family homes" containing six or fewer persons may be considered
as permitted uses in single family or residential zones. 170 Under the
Act, the state director of developmental disabilities has the power
to promulgate regulations to limit the number of community resid-
ences to be permitted based upon population density and the location
of previously established residences. 7' Neighbors have standing to
challenge a community residence application on the ground that the
residence is violative of a distance limitation or quota. 72 The Model
of the application increasing the number of residents to be served at
least fifteen (15) days prior to the granting of a license.
(4) 'In order to facilitate the implementation of paragraph (1)(a), the
director shall maintain a list of the location, capacity, and current
occupancy of all family homes. The director shall ensure that this list
shall not contain the names or other identifiable information about any
residents of such home and that copies of this list shall be available to
any resident of this state and any state agency or political subdivision
upon request.
Section 6. Exclusion by Private Agreement Void
Any restriction, reservation, condition, exception, or covenant in any
subdivision plan, deed, or other instrument of or pertaining to the transfer,
sale, lease or use of property which would permit residential use of
property but prohibit the use of such property as a family home for
developmentally disabled persons shall, to the extent of such prohibition,
be void as against the public policy of this state and shall be given no
legal or equitable force or effect.
Section 7. Severability of Sections
If any section, subsection, paragraph, sentence, or any other part of
this act is adjudged unconstitutional or invalid, such judgment shall not
affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of this act, but Shall be confined
to the section, subsection, paragraph, sentence, or any other part of this
act directly involved in the controversy in which said judgment has been
rendered.
MODEL ACT TO ESTABLISH THE RIGHT TO LOCATE COMMUNrrY HOMES FOR DEVEL-
OPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS IN THE RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS OF Tins STATE
1978 [hereinafter ABA MODEL ACT].
168. Id.
169. Id. § 2.
170. Id. §§ 3(4), 4.
171. Id. § 5(l)(a).
172. Id. § 5(l)(d). One state statute actually gives homeowners standing to bring
proceedings against community residences. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-3e(b)
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Act further provides that community residences need only follow
the building, housing, health, fire, safety, motor vehicle parking and
environmental provisions applicable to single family dwellings."'
Sponsoring agencies are required to notify local officials of their
intent to establish a residence.17 4 Finally, restrictive covenants per-
mitting residential use of property but prohibiting the use of property
for community residences are void as against public policy and
hence, are unenforceable.'"
(West Supp. 1987). By applying New York's liberal standing doctrine, New York
courts have granted resident homeowners standing to challenge community residence
determinations. See, e.g., Grasmere Homeowners Ass'n v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 778,
443 N.Y.S.2d 956 (2d Dep't 1981); Karas v. New York State Office of Mental
Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, No. 15601/82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
aff'd mem., 95 A.D.2d 984, 464 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 60
N.Y.2d 560, 459 N.E.2d 863, 471 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1983). But see Polo Park Civic
Ass'n v. Kiernan, 133 A.D.2d 116, 518 N.Y.S.2d 652 (2d Dep't 1987) (neighbors
cannot challenge municipality's decision not to oppose community residence site),
leave to appeal denied, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1988, at 13, col. 2; Town of Hempstead
v. Commissioner, 119 A.D.2d 582, 500 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1986) (neighbors
have no right to participate in early stages of site selection procedure). For a
discussion of homeowners' attempts to block the establishment of community
residences in their neighborhoods, see supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
173. ABA MODEL ACT, supra note 167, § 5(1)(c).
174. Id. § 5(3). Authorities disagree as to the wisdom of notifying municipalities
and communities about the planned development of community residences. Some
authorities advocate a "Machiavellian" approach towards the establishment of
community residences; sponsoring agencies should not give communities any notice
on the theory that communities will develop more favorable attitudes towards
residences after their establishment. See R. LUBIN, A. SCHWARTZ, W. ZIGMAN &
M. JANICKI, COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE OF -RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS FOR DEVELOP-
MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 9 (Living Alternatives Research Project 1981) (available
at Fordham Urban Law Journal ,office). Other authorities favor notification and
note the success of New York's statute which provides for community notification.
See ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 26, at 195-96; see also M. JANICKI, P.
CASTELLANI & R. LUBIN, A PERSPECTIVE ON THE SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF NEW
YORK'S COMMUNITY RESIDENCE SYSTEM 2 (Living Alternatives Research Project 1982)
(available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office). A study of New York's statute
providing for community notification indicated that lawsuits were brought against
only one out of every 10 community residences. AFTER EIGHT YEARS, supra note
19, at 36.
175. ABA MODEL ACT, supra note 167, § 6. Only five states have statutes similar
to the provisions of the Model Code. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-13-21-14 (West
Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 358A.25(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 168-23 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 27-17-4 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.03(22)(d)
(West 1987). Three states have recently enacted statutes inapplicable to previously
drafted covenants. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-582(G) (1986); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 89.020(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988); TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 101In, § 5
(Vernon Supp. 1988). The majority of state courts, however, have refused to enforce
restrictive convenants to enjoin the establishment of community residences. See,
e.g., Cain v. Delaware Sec. Invs., 7 Mental Disab. Law Rptr. 384 (Del. Ch. 1983);
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The Model Act, however, is flawed. In declaring that only "family
homes" containing six or fewer persons may be considered as per-
mitted uses in single family or residential zones, 76 the Act ignores
the viability of community residences for more than six persons.177
By treating community residences for mentally retarded persons dif-
ferently from other single family and residential dwellings, the Model
Act would appear to violate City of Cleburne.7 S The portion of the
Model Act permitting the state director to set distance limitations
and quotas on community residences for mentally retarded persons
Clark v. Manuel, 463 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1985); Vienna Bend Subdivision Homeowners
Ass'n v. Manning, 459 So. 2d 1345 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Concord Estates Home-
owners Ass'n Inc. v. Special Children's Found., Inc., 459 So. 2d 1242 (La. Ct.
App. 1984); Harbour v. Normal Life of Louisiana, Inc., 454 So. 2d 1208 (La.
Ct. App. 1984); Tucker v. Special Children's Found., Inc., 449 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d 959 (1984); Craig v. Bossenberry, 134 Mich. App.
543, 351 N.W.2d 596 (1984); McMillan v. Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d
559 (1982); Leland Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. R.T. Partnership, i06 Mich. App.
790, 308 N.W.2d 648 (1981); Malcolm v. Shamie, 95 Mich. App. 132, 290 N.W.2d
101 (1980); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Sys. Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269
N.W.2d 673 (1978); Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981);
Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407
(Mo. 1986); State v. District Court, 187 Mont. 126, 609 P.2d 245 (1980); Knudtson
v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364
A.2d 993 (1976); Crane Neck Ass'n v. NYC/Long Island County Servs. Group,
61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804
(1984); J.T. Hobby & Sons v. Family Homes, 302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1981);
Smith v. Association for Retarded Citizens, 75 N.C. App. 435, 331 S.E.2d 324
(1985); Beres v. Hope Homes, Inc., 6 Ohio App. 3d 71, 453 N.E.2d 1119 (1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985);
Gregory v. State Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps., 495 A.2d 997
(R.I. 1985); Permian Basin Centers v. Alsobrook, 723 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986); Collins v. City of El Campo, 684 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Crowley
v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980). But see Seaton v. Clifford,
24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 50-51, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1972) (sheltered living facility
for handicapped did not constitute a "residential purpose" use and thus violated
restrictive covenant); Omega Corp. of Chesterfield v. Malloy, 228 Va. 12, 19, 319
S.E.2d 728, 732 (1984) (public officials supervising operation of home deemed to
have changed character of home from residence to institution), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1192 (1985). See also Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 407, n.7,
181 Cal. Rptr. 703, 709, n.7 (1982) (questioning vitality of Seaton in light of "changed
circumstances in a rapidly developing area of social concern"); Brussack, Group
Homes, Families and Meaning in the Law of Subdivision Covenants, 16 GA. L.
REv. 33 (1981) (framework for analyzing constitutional validity of restrictive cov-
enants); Guernsey, The Mentally Retarded and Private Restrictive Covenants, 25
Wm. & MARY L. REV. 421, 442 (1984) (same); Annotation, Community Residence
for Mentally Disabled Persons as Violation of Restrictive Covenant, 41 A.L.R.4TH
1216 (1985).
176. ABA MODEL ACT, supra note 167, §§ 3(4), 4.
177. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 98-99, 104-20 and accompanying text.
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not applicable to other similar permitted uses would also run afoul
of City of Cleburne.'79 Moreover, the portion of the Act granting
neighboring homeowners standing to challenge a community residence
application on the ground that the residence violates a distance
limitation or quota can only encourage litigation between neighbors
and sponsoring agencies of community residences and thus would
not further the Act's goal of promoting the establishment of com-
munity residences.'10
Nonetheless, the Model Act does have some salutary provisions.
By providing that community residences are single family dwellings
for all purposes, 8' it would forbid municipalities from enforcing
institutional building codes182 and requiring environmental impact
studies'83 of community residences. In this respect, the Model Act
correctly recognizes that there is no legitimate reason for treating
community residences differently from other single family residences.
With regard to the Model Act's provision declaring that restrictive
covenants prohibiting community residences are void and unenforce-
able, 84 an argument can be made that by having a retroactive effect
on previously agreed upon covenants, the Model Act would impair
179. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
180. See ABA MODEL ACT, supra note 167, § 2.
181. Id. §§ 4, 5(l)(c).
182. Id. If the state or county operates the community residence, it should be
immune from local building codes under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., County of Westchester v. Village of Mamaroneck, 22 A.D.2d 143, 255 N.Y.S.2d
290 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 940, 212 N.E.2d 442, 264 N.Y.S.2d 925
(1965); Gedney Ass'n v. New York State Dep't Of Mental Hygiene, 112 Misc. 2d
209, 446 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1982); Incorporated Village
of Old Field v. Introne, 104 Misc. 2d 122, 430 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1980). Several state statutes bar the application of institutional building
codes to community residences. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-582(C), (D) (1986);
IDAHO CODE § 67-6532(c) (1980); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(f) (McKinney
Supp. 1986); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.19(f) (Anderson Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 46.03(22)(b) (West 1987)..
183. ABA MODEL ACT, supra note 167, § 5(l)(c). Because other single family
dwellings are not subjected to environmental review, such review would not be
imposed on community residences. In New York, a commissioner's regulation
specifically declares that community residences need not submit to environmental
review before their establishment. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 14,
§ 52.14(b)(Type II)(h) (1977); see also Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic De-
velopmental Disabilities Servs. Office, No. 2983-82 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1983)
(no environmental impact study required of community residences in New York);
Brennan v. Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities of New
York, No. 21697/81 (Sup. Ct. Warren County 1981) (same).
184. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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private contracts in violation of the United States Constitution. 85
The New York Court of Appeals, however, rejected that argument
in Crane Neck Association v. NYC/LI -County Services Group.'86
In that case, the court of appeals held that executive pronouncements
made between 1954 and 1984 and statutes favoring the establishment
of community residences for mentally retarded persons'8 prohibited
enforcement of a 1945 restrictive covenant against the establishment
of a community residence. 188 The Crane Neck court rejected the
argument that the later policies could not prohibit the enforcement
of the earlier covenant.' 89 The court held that the state has the right
to impair contracts by subsequent legislation "so long as it is rea-
sonably necessary to further an important public purpose and the
measures taken that impair the contract are reasonable and appro-
priate to effectuate that purpose"' 9° even in situations not requiring
emergency, temporary state actions.' 9' The court then found:
[T]he state's interest in protecting the welfare of mentally and
developmentally disabled individuals is clearly an important public
purpose, and the means used to select the sites for community
residences are reasonable and appropriate to effectuate the state's
program of providing the most effective care in the least restrictive
environment. In such circumstances, appellants' private contract
rights may not override state policy. 192
In sum, the Model Act contains some laudatory provisions, partic-
ularly those relevant to local building codes and restrictive covenants.
The Model Act's inclusion of provisions limiting the number of
persons that may reside in a community residence in single family
zones and permitting officials to place distance limitations and quotas
on community residences, however, does not facilitate the estab-
185. Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part,
that "No state shall ... pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
186. 61 N.Y.2d 154, 166-67, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1343, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 908-09,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984).
187. Id. at 164, 460 N.E.2d at 1341, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 906-07.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 167, 460 N.E.2d at 1343, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
190. Id.
191. Id. The plaintiffs cited cases involving Depression-era, emergency legislation
to support their argument that a state can impair contract rights in only limited
circumstances. Id. The more modern view, as adopted by the court of appeals in
Crane Neck, is that.the public policy that can prohibit the enforcement of a contract
does not have to be related to an emergency or temporary situation. See Energy
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1984).
192. 61 N.Y.2d at 167, 460 N.E.2d at 1343, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
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lishment of community residences. Furthermore, as previously dis-
cussed, such restrictions may be unconstitutional. 93
VII. Recommendations
Pursuant to City of Cleburne, state statutes regulating community
residences for mentally retarded persons must treat such residences
like any other homes absent a rational basis grounded in a legitimate
state interest justifying different treatment.194 The following are pro-
posed recommendations for a model statute that would, in general,
treat community residences like other homes.
First, like the Model Act, 95 a community residence statute should
begin with a preamble stating that it is the policy of the state to
encourage the establishment of community residences and that the
statute and any other statutes or ordinances should be construed
liberally toward that end. 196
Next, because community residences pose no greater threat to a
neighborhood than other residences 197 and there is no evidence that
community residences housing more than a certain number of re-
sidents are not viable, 98 the statute should permit the operation of
community residences in single family and residential zones without
specifying the number of persons that may reside in such residences.199
Some community residences may be too large to provide their re-
sidents with a home-like atmosphere. Therefore, the statute should
give the state commissioner who licenses residences for mentally
retarded persons the discretion to bar residences whose size inhibits
a home-like atomosphere.
Similarly, a community residence statute should not include dis-
tance limitations between community residences or quotas on the
193. See supra notes 104-28 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 98-140 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 167.
196. ABA MODEL ACT, supra note 167, § 2. Court decisions denying enforcement
of restrictive covenants because of a statute's stated public policy favoring community
residences demonstrate the necessity of such public policy statements. See, e.g.,
Cain v. Delaware Sec. Invs., 7 Mental Disab. Law Rptr. 384 (Del. Ch. 1983);
Vienna Bend Subdivision Homeowners Ass'n v. Manning, 459 So. 2d 1345 (La.
Ct. App. 1984); Craig v. Bossenberry, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596 (1984);
Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Sys. Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d
673 (1978); Crane Neck Ass'n v. NYC/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d
154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984).
197. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 104-20 and accompanying text.
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number of mentally retarded persons that may reside in a community
residence. Distance limitations and quotas are clearly unconstitutional 0
and do not effectively serve to avoid "ghettoization" 2 °' of mentally
retarded persons. Again, discretion should be left to the state com-
missioner on mental retardation to determine whether the location
of a particular residence would hinder its ability to provide a home-
like atmosphere to its residents. New York's statute providing that
a community residence location can be rejected only if it creates an
overconcentration of similar residences that would. result in the
substantial alteration of an area, 0 2 has been upheld 03 and is beneficial
to both communities and to mentally retarded persons who may not
benefit from living in a substantially altered area.204
To promote good will and communication between community
residence operators and local officials, statutes should provide that
the sponsoring agencies of community residences give municipalities
some notification of their intentions prior to the establishment of
such facilities.205 The statute should make clear that no notice need
be given to neighbors and homeowners groups and that neighbors
and homeowners groups have no standing to bring court actions
against community residences. Neighbors and homeowners groups,
in attempts to block the establishment of residences, have used nu-
merous legal and extra-legal tactics. 2° Given this fact, notice to them
of a community residence prior to its establishment will not promote
or facilitate the development of such residences.
200. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
202. N.Y. MENTAL HYc. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1988). In New
York, the commissioner can refuse to license a community residence that does not
meet his standards even if the residence demonstrates that it would not create an
overconcentration of residences substantially altering the area. See N.Y. Comp.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 686.1 (1985); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 31.05
(McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1988). Because state commissioners responsible for the
care and treatment of mentally retarded persons have the expertise and duty to
provide services, state commissioners rather than local zoning officials should make
the final determination as to whether a community residence can provide a safe
setting for its residents. See Town of Oyster Bay v. New York State Office of
Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 115 A.D.2d 536, 537, 496 N.Y.S.2d
61, 62 (2d Dep't 1985) (state commissioner rather than municipality had right to
determine whether persons designated to reside in proposed community residence
were capable of self-preservation).
203. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
204. See SITE SELECTION STUDY, supra note 125, at 26-27.
205. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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It is further recommended that, like the Model Act, the statute
clearly state that community residences are single family homes for
building, housing, health, fire, safety, motor vehicle parking and
environmental purposes. 207 Similarly, the statute should declare that
restrictive covenants cannot be enforced against the establishment
of community residences2 8 and that the statute applies to restrictive
covenants entered into prior to the enactment of the statute. 2°9 Finally,
it is recommended that the statute contain a clause stating that it
is unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of any housing
accommodation against any person because of his or her mental
retardation .210
VIII. Conclusion
The deinstitutionalization of mentally retarded persons and the
placement of such persons in community settings have been na-
tionwide policies for the past two decades. The evidence is over-
whelming that community residences do not pose threats to their
neighbors. Many state statutes purporting to facilitate the devel-
207. ABA MODEL ACT, supra note 167, § 5(1)(c).
208. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
210. A statutory provision of this type proved enormously valuable to a com-
munity residence in New York. See People v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1982), vacated in part on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (1983). In 11 Cornwell
Company, a group of homeowners learned of plans for a proposed community
residence in their neighborhood. They united to purchase the house proposed for
the community residence solely to prevent the sponsoring agency interested in the
site from purchasing the property. 695 F.2d at 37-38. The federal District Court
for the Eastern District of New York found that the neighbors's actions violated
a New York State statute prohibiting homeowners from discriminating against a
person because of his disability in the sale of a housing accommodation. Id. This
finding was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. at 44.
A bill that would amend Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to prohibit
sellers of property and landlords from discriminating against prospective buyers
and renters on account of their physical or mental handicaps has been introduced
before Congress. S. 558, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. Rc. 2229 (daily ed.
Feb 19, 1987). Section 6 of the bill forbids a seller or landlord to "discriminate
in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
buyer or renter because of a handicap of ... that buyer or renter, . . . a person
residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or
made available; or . . . any person associated with that buyer or renter." S. 558,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6. Section 5 of the bill defines handicap as "a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities." Id. § 5. Section 8 of the bill provides for an administrative procedure
to settle disputes and permits aggrieved parties to bring their own civil actions
against discriminatory sellers and landlords. Id.
[Vol. XVI"-
COMMUNITY RESIDENCES
opment of residences and local ordinances, however, still stand in
the way of further residential development. As a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Cleburne, state statutes that treat com-
munity residences differently from other residences without a rational
basis grounded in a legitimate state interest are, arguably, no longer
viable. Therefore, it is doubtful that statutes limiting the number
of persons that may live in community residences in single family
areas are still valid. Also suspect are statutes that impose distance
limitations between residences, statutes that impose quotas on residences
and some regulations that are solely applicable to community
residences. Moreover, while local ordinances using a nondiscriminatory
definition of the term "family" were not invalidated by City of
Cleburne, those ordinances may be invalid under state due process
clauses. In response to the City of Cleburne decision and to assure
that the nationwide policy of deinstitutionalization is furthered, state
legislatures should amend their statutes to treat community residences
for mentally retarded persons like other homes.
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